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Existing research on entry mode determinants is firmly grounded in the transaction cost and 
resource-based literature while location-and institution-specific characteristics lack attention. 
The primary goal of this article is to address the determinants of entry mode by Japanese 
manufacturing firms in Southeast Asia after the financial crisis on the basis of a theoretical 
framework that integrates firm-specific, industry-specific, location-and institution-specific 
factors. Results show that locational factors make significant contributions to the 





Entry mode; transaction costs; resource commitment; location factors; country risk; Japanese 














  Ownership Strategies in Post-Financial Crisis Southeast Asia:  




The selection of a multinational’s ownership structure abroad is one of the most important 
strategic decisions affecting both corporate performance and the speed of its 
internationalization process (Palenzuela and Bobillo 1999; Chang and Rosenzweig 2001; 
Zhao and Luo 2002; Woodcock, Beamish et al. 1994; Makino and Beamish 2001; Douma, 
George et al. 2006). To date, empirical research on ownership structure is skewed toward 
Japanese or European multinational enterprises (MNEs)’ entry into the US (Hennart 1991; 
Hennart and Park 1993; Hennart and Reddy 1997; Hennart and Larimo 1998; Chen and 
Hennart 2002; Nisbet, Thomas et al. 2003), into Europe (Somlev and Hoshino 2005; Cleeve 
1997) and into China (Shi, Ho et al. 2001; Tsang 2005; Claver and Quer 2005). Despite the 
importance of Japanese firms’ production activities in Southeast Asia, there are few studies 
done pertinent to Japanese MNEs’ ownership strategy in the region in the post-crisis period in 
particular. This gap should be narrowed for two reasons: First, Japanese MNEs need a clear 
understanding of the factors to be taken into account, when planning a new investment 
project. The pattern of ownership behaviour of their peers provides valuable guidance to 
follower firms in such a difficult setting as post-crisis ASEAN, where the crisis destroyed 
many received truths about what might constitute an appropriate strategy. And second, host 
governments often take a keen interest in the ownership structure of their foreign investors. It 
is not by chance that many ASEAN governments share a history of restricting foreign 
ownership some way or other. They believe that FDIs tend to be more beneficial for host 
countries, e.g. in terms of technology transfers, if local equity partners are involved. Thus, 
they should be very interested in the determinants of ownership preferences by MNEs in order 
to align their economic policies accordingly. 
The objective of this paper is to shed light on the current set of determinants of the 
ownership decision of Japanese foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Southeast Asia. Japan 
has been an important source of FDI in the region for many years. Between 1995 and 2004 it 
accounted for 14% of the inflows, second only to the US with 18% (ASEAN-Japan Centre 
2006). It even topped the list for the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam in the period. We 
focus on a single home country, since MNEs have been shown to retain many factor endowments, which are specific to their home country (for a typology see Borrus 1996: 30; 
for Japanese MNE, e.g. Hatch and Yamamura 1996). 
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section provides an overview of recent 
trends in FDI and investment policy in Southeast Asia. The third section presents our 
theoretical framework based on a review of the literature on FDI ownership structures. After 
specifying our econometric model in section four, the fifth section presents the empirical 
results. The findings are discussed in section 6, and section 7 concludes. 
Recent trends of FDI and investment policy in Southeast Asia 
This section highlights a number of key features of investment policy and recent FDI flows 
into the region. 
Trends in FDI flows 
In the early 1990s Southeast Asia emerged as a core investment location for FDI in the 
developing world. In 1996 the share in developing country FDI stock reached a maximum of 
23% before declining relatively to 14% in 2005. In this year, of the 35% of world total FDI 
flows targeted at developing countries, 11.5% still came to the region. Absolute stocks were 
rising almost continuously over the period, standing at 375 billion USD in 2005 (UNCTAD 
2007). However, while total stocks have been soaring, the distribution among individual 
countries is markedly uneven. Figure 1 illustrates on a logarithmic scale the leading role of 
Singapore. Malaysia and Thailand follow at a large distance, while Indonesia has clearly 
fallen behind. 
 
Figure 1: The Development of FDI Stocks in Southeast Asian Countries 
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  2Figure 2: The Importance of FDI for Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Southeast Asian 
Countries 
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FDI dependency, measured as the share of FDI in the Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 
also varies widely. Singapore is now almost completely depending on foreign capital for its 
economic accumulation. In many countries dependency has been dropping in recent years, 
showcasing a widespread policy reorientation with the aim to reduce vulnerability from 
globalized financial markets. But interestingly, the data in Figure 2 suggests that FDI actually 
helped stabilizing the capital formation during the Asian crisis in a number of countries, such 
as Myanmar, Cambodia and Thailand. Even if there obviously have been cases of swift 
divestments, such anecdotal evidence is hardly supported by the macro figures.  
  3A sketch of absolute annual FDI inflows (Figure 3) supports the emerging picture. 
Singapore is - and has been for many years - the largest receiver of FDI inflows in the region. 
In many countries the development seems to stagnate, with two noteworthy exceptions: While 
Vietnam has been emerging as a new investment location during the 1990s and levelling off 
in recent years, the period between 1998 and 2003 marked intense fluctuations in Indonesia, 
even leading to net investment outflows. 
 
Figure 3: The Development of FDI Flows into Southeast Asian Countries in Absolute 
Figures 


































     Cambodia
     Indonesia
     Malaysia
     Myanmar
     Philippines
     Singapore
     Thailand
     Vietnam
 
Of Japan’s 5 trillion Yen of FDI outflows in 2005, 11% have gone to Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Japanese outward investment is generally dominated by 
the manufacturing sector (57% of total FDI flows in 2005), in ASEAN it accounts for 45% 
followed by financial services at 30% and trade/commerce at 6% (Statistics Bureau 2007; 
ASEAN-Japan Centre 2006). The distribution across manufacturing industries and host 
countries is highlighted by Figure 4. It shows that resource-based industries concentrate 
investment in Indonesia and Thailand, while process industry investments tend to cluster in 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Japanese firms investing in the textile 
industry are concentrated in Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. 
 
  4Figure 4: The Industrial Distribution of Japanese Manufacturing FDI in Southeast Asia 
  across Host Countries (in 2004) 














Manufacturing 2,886.6 432.0  0.1 111.5 0.1 35.0 2.0 61.3  69.3  132.8 20.2
Food 187.3 78.8     
Textile 45.5 8.9    
Lumber and Pulp  95.3 67.7    
Chemicals and 
Pharmaceuticals  375.5 44.8    
Petroleum 55.2 -42.5    
Rubber and 
Leather  92.5 21.1    
Glass and 
Ceramics  27.0 25.7     
Metals 148.0 23.8    
General 
Machinery  145.4 26.8    
Electric 
Machinery  480.9 30.0     
Tansportation 
Equipment  946.1 111.4     
Precision 
Machinery  155.2 23.4    
      
Notes:  In billion Yen 
Shaded fields refer to sector-country combinations accounting for more than 10 % of 
investment in respective categories     
    country    sector     country and sector   
Source:   ASEAN-Japan Centre (2006) 
 
According to the Toyo Keizai Kanigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Sōran there have been a total of 
about 450 new manufacturing investments of Japanese firms in Southeast Asia in the period 
between 1998 and 2004 (Toyo Keizai Inc. 1998-2004). With only a few exceptions, these 
investments are concentrated in only 6 countries. Available ownership information, which 
refers to 318 establishments, shows an absolute majority of wholly-owned subsidiaries and a 
roughly equal distribution of the remainder between Joint ventures with and without local 
company participation (see Table 1).  
 
  5Table 1: Distribution of Japanese Manufacturing Investments in Southeast Asia 





Joint Ventures  Total 
Cambodia  0 0  1  1 
Indonesia  20 17  18  55 
Malaysia  14 8  4  26 
Myanmar  0 0  2  2 
Philippines  31 1  8  40 
Singapore  16 4  2  22 
Thailand  69 23  39  131 
Vietnam  22 8  11  41 
Total  172 61  85  318 
 
Source: Toyo Keizai Inc. (1998-2004), calculations by authors 
 
Figure 5 illustrates that there is no clear tendency over time towards any of the investment 
modes, even if wholly-owned subsidiaries were briefly dominant around the year 2001. There 
are differences according to country, however. Vietnam experienced a significant shift 
towards the wholly-owned investment mode and towards wholly-foreign-owned modes in 
general
1. Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar show a consistently high ratio of 
investments with local equity participation, and Indonesia as well as Malaysia have 
disproportionately many foreign equity joint ventures (JVs). 
 

































                                                 
























Source: Data from Toyo Keizai Inc. (1998-2004), 























































A number of locational factors have been discussed as potential determinants of entry mode 
choice. Prominent among them are the investment policies and public institutions bearing on 
the local investment climate. The following paragraphs provide an overview over a number of 
the policy and institutional characteristics of the ASEAN countries. 
Investment policy and climate 
A general perceptive picture of the business and investment climate in ASEAN countries can 
be gleaned from the Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index and its components (see 
Table 2). What strikes about most of the component indices is their high correlation with the 
overall score, which indicates either the existence of an underlying variable such as 
administrative capacity, or a bias introduced with the methodology of subjective measures. 
  7The only exception is the business freedom sub-index, where Vietnam and Laos perform 
much better than their overall score. 
 
Table 2: Investment Freedom 















Singapore  2 85.7  94.6 80 90 94  99.3 
Malaysia  48 65.8  68.6 40  50  51 89.5 
Thailand  50 65.6  76.1 30  50  38 90.4 
Philippines  97 57.4  54.2 30  30  25 60.7 
Cambodia  102 56.5 37.1  50  30  23  67.7 
Indonesia  110 55.1 45.7  30  30  22  67.5 
Vietnam  138  50 62 30 10 26  59.3 
Laos  140  49.1 51  30  10  33 53.5 
Myanmar  153  40.1  20 10 10 18 20 
Notes:  The business freedom and labour freedom scores are calculated from the World Bank’s 
objective Doing Business Indicators. The Freedom from corruption indicator equals the 
tenfold Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International. 
Source: Heritage Foundation (2007) 
 
The investment policy in ASEAN countries is assessed by the Heritage Foundation indicator 
on investment freedom (see Figure 6). The values of this perceptive measure are relatively 
stable over time. While providing for convenient comparisons, as a one-dimensional measure 
it clearly suffers from over-simplicity. So, it is not able to capture many of the detailed 
reforms in the investment regimes of FDI host countries. We will therefore complement 
presentation of the measure with a verbal treatment of the individual country cases.  
Myanmar maintains the most restrictive policies towards FDI in ASEAN. While there is a 
Foreign Investment Law since 1988, and either the cabinet or the Trade Policy Council 
occasionally issues investment permissions, an informal ban on the issuance of new business 
licenses has virtually brought FDI to a halt in 2002. Moreover, all operations are subject to 
ubiquitous corruption. On the other hand, corruption opens a pathway for a few well-
connected investors to dodge regulations. Overall, Japanese firms have a total of only 22 FDI 
projects permitted by the Myanmar government, the number of actual investments being 






  8Figure 6: Investment Freedom 







































Laos has improved its policies towards foreign investors in recent years, but it still remains an 
overtly socialist country with strong regulation of private business. 163 days and 8 different 
procedures to open a business put a large burden on interested foreign investors. Gradual 
improvements result from the 2004 Law on the Promotion of Foreign Investment, which in 
principal opened non-strategic sectors to FDI. But still intellectual property rights (IPR) 
legislation and the overall investment climate are rated as being poor. The main institutional 
obstacle seems to lie in inconsistent and arbitrary implementation of existing laws and 
regulations in combination with serious corruption. (U.S. Commercial Service 2005; Heritage 
Foundation 2007).  
Vietnam is another socialist one-party state, but it has shown improvements in regulation and 
deregulation during the last decade. The fundamental difference to the above countries may 
be that Vietnam has started to consciously embrace FDI as a possible conduit for economic 
development. Since the country implemented its Enterprise Law in 2000, the number of days 
needed to start a business has been brought down to 50. In 2005, a common Investment Law 
was passed levelling the playing field for domestic and foreign investment. Still, large-scale 
  9FDI projects (above app. 19 mil. USD) and investments in specific sectors have to be 
approved by the Ministry of Planning and Investment and other government bodies. With a 
larger number of involved parties, the severe corruption problem makes itself felt more by 
enterprises. At least, smaller projects in non-restricted sectors can be licensed on the 
provincial level since 2006. On the positive side, proactive provincial governments have 
significantly streamlined their procedures, while on the flipside uncertainty may have 
increased through decentralization. Taken together, Vietnam has clearly improved its 
institutional environment for FDI, which, surprisingly, is not yet reflected by the investment 
freedom sub-index so far (U.S. Commercial Service 2007f; Heritage Foundation 2007). 
Indonesia’s track record with regard to investment conditions is rather mixed. Generally, it is 
open to foreign investment, except for 19 industries, which were closed for investments in 
2000. Administrative procedures to obtain necessary permits remain time-consuming and 
complex. In 2003 a copyright law took effect, which improved IPR protection to a point, 
where improvements were recognized by the US government. This does not mean, however, 
that the problem is solved, as long as producers still claim that the majority of CDs, for 
instance, continues to be pirated. Indonesia’s tradition of vaguely formulated laws and 
regulations has always offered opportunities for rent seeking and arbitrary bureaucratic action. 
The situation has even worsened with the IMF-induced decentralization drive following the 
Asian financial crisis. Before, government behaviour was said to follow a roughly predictable 
pattern. Decentralization has then multiplied the number of agencies with some sort of 
authority, leading to a situation, where corruption became partly deinstitutionalized 
intensifying business risk (U.S. Commercial Service 2007b; Heritage Foundation 2007). 
Cambodia’s law on investment dates back to 1994. Since then a largely free investment 
climate offered near-unlimited access for foreign capital, only in a few sectors have minor 
restrictions been subsequently put in place. Liberal laws as such do not, however, guarantee 
smooth and efficient administrative procedures. Low administrative capacity leads to lengthy 
procedures of around 97 days when registering a new company. While intellectual property 
rights protection is still in its infancy, physical property rights are usually honoured, even 
though the judicial system is judged to be too corrupt to provide adequate protection, . (U.S. 
Commercial Service 2003; Heritage Foundation 2007). 
Much of what has been said on Cambodia equally applies to the Philippines. The Foreign 
Investment Act form 1991 is similarly non-discriminatory. Two extensive negative lists pose 
notable restrictions on FDI, but around 40 bilateral investment agreements remove many 
  10obstacles. Unfortunately, just as in the case of Cambodia, this advantage is set off by high 
levels of corruption and an ineffective judicial system. An intellectual property codes is in 
effect since 1997 but enforcement remains relatively weak (Heritage Foundation 2007; U.S. 
Commercial Service 2007g). 
Thailand  used to follow a generally open investment policy with foreign ownership 
restrictions limited to 32 professions as well as extra-industrial estate land. Investment in five 
technology-intensive priority sectors in recent years even became encouraged through 
provision of special incentives. Procedures for opening a business are taking just over a month 
and are therefore relatively swift. The Foreign Business Act from 1999 is now under revision 
to introduce constraints on more sectors and on foreign ownership above 50% of equity. The 
judiciary system is independent and functioning satisfactorily, even in the field of IPR 
protection (U.S. Commercial Service 2007e; Heritage Foundation 2007).  
Malaysia is similar to Thailand in its investment regime and administrative as well as judicial 
capacity. However, it should be noted that the main difference between the two countries is 
that in Malaysia the affirmative action in favour of the Bumiputera (or indigenous) population 
penetrates all areas of economic policy. FDI used to be affected most by a requirement for 
Bumiputera equity participation of 30 percent. Since the strict requirement was loosened in 
2003, Bumiputera participation has been important for the evaluation of licence applications. 
The foreign investment conditions have always been managed through administrative 
procedures instead of laws. Many investment projects, especially those with high 
technological content or location in remote areas benefit from substantial incentives, which 
are not transparently spelled out subject to negotiations with the Malaysia Industrial 
Development Authority and the decision-making high-level government committees. The 
judicial and bureaucratic system is generally effective, with some problems of corruption or 
insufficient implementation (Heritage Foundation 2007; U.S. Commercial Service 2007c). 
Singapore  undisputedly has the most advanced systems in place to govern FDI. The 
administration has a reputation of being highly effective, and all sub-systems are conducive to 
foreign investment. FDI generally benefits from equal status as local investment (U.S. 
Commercial Service 2007d; Heritage Foundation 2007). 
In sum, the ASEAN countries represent a diverse range of investment regimes, which renders 
the region an ideal object of analysis of the locational characteristics influencing entry mode 
strategies of Japanese firms. We now turn to the existing literature in order to highlight earlier 
findings on what characteristics may exert significant influence. 
  11Analytical Framework of Entry Mode Selection 
It is not unreasonable to say that MNE perspectives (transaction cost theory and resource-
based view) have dominated over location-and institution-specific variations when discussing 
entry mode selection in a given location (Yiu and Makino 2002; Meyer and Nguyen 2005). 
Traditionally, proprietary assets (Hymer 1960) and internalization advantages (Rugman 1980) 
are emphasized in entry mode theory. However, since Dunning (1998) raised the concern that 
locational factors are neglected in entry mode research, location-and institution-specific 
factors have also been drawing increasing attention in recent years. In this section we review 
the literature with regard to two major entry modes: (1) full ownership and (2) shared 
ownership. We report on received views and - sometimes - offer alternative interpretations of 
existing theories concerning the impact of location-and institution characteristics.  
One of the most important theories on entry mode selection is the transaction cost 
theory, from which the logic of internalization advantages is derived. Williamson (1985) 
claims that MNEs are likely to internalize technological knowledge, marketing skills and 
managerial know-how within their hierarchical organizations because transactions at arm’s 
length tend to be costly and uncertain. We choose transaction cost theory as the basic 
foundation of our conceptual framework for the entry mode selection of MNEs. Entry in the 
form of wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOSs) reduces the MNE’s transaction costs of engaging 
in new ventures. Full ownership modes allow the parent to protect its intangible assets from 
market inefficiencies and failure while a high level of control over its new venture helps the 
parent company to implement desired strategies and achieve its goals. The advantages of a 
full ownership strategy are derived from notions of free-riding by project partners (Chang and 
Rosenzweig 2001; Madhok 2005), monitoring costs (Anderson and Gatignon 1986), and the 
issue of shirking (Gomes-Casseres 1989). To be more specific, full ownership modes enable 
the parent to independently dictate value systems, technological innovation, resource 
networks, organizational patterns, financial leverage and managerial methods of its local 
affiliates at a lower cost although it requires the longest time to establish the venture 
(Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Newburry and Zeira 1997; Chang and Rosenzweig 2001). 
Empirically, it is confirmed by previous scholarship (Delios and Beamish 1999; Yiu and 
Makino 2002) that contributed assets, as measured by advertising intensity and R&D 
intensity, exert a positive effect on Japanese firms’ preference for full ownership. 
Compared to full ownership, the form of JV places constraints on a firm’s flexibility in 
coordinating and arranging local operations in the quest for the formation of global value 
chains (Meyer and Nguyen 2005). Such coordination problems become more difficult to solve 
  12over time because business interests of one partner in the joint venture may gradually diverge 
from those of another (Palenzuela and Bobillo 1999; Chang and Rosenzweig 2001). Yiu and 
Makino (2002: 668-671) posit that the cost of integrating contributed assets by local partners 
into a new venture may exceed the benefit from “a free ride on their reputational capital” 
when their assets are intangible. MNEs wish to obtain local firms’ private information while 
local partners aim at absorbing proprietary assets from MNEs. Such diverging agendas appear 
to trigger the dissolution of JVs because both actors may suffer from the agency problem.  
From the resource-based view, it is often discussed that a firm with poor international 
experience and regional networks is less likely to undertake full ownership entry because of 
insufficient knowledge on foreign operations, weak bargaining capabilities with local 
government officials, and cultural differences. Given these resource disadvantages, shared 
ownership can be more profitable because it acts as a strategic FDI device to overcome the 
liability of foreignness (Gatignon and Anderson 1988). Davidson (1980) buttresses the 
argument that cumulative experience gives rise to learning, which explains FDI behaviour of 
foreign firms. Delios and Beamish (1999) also found that more internationally experienced 
Japanese firms tend to choose higher equity ratios. Shared ownership allows foreign firms to 
benefit from synergetic effects through combining their own organizational and managerial 
capabilities with required resources, such as extensive local distribution networks and 
knowledge of consumer preferences in local markets, which lie in the hands of potential 
partners. In financial terms, shared ownership is generally preferable since each JV parent 
only has partial financial responsibility over the venture (Newburry and Zeira 1997) while 
profit sharing ensures the necessary incentives to abstain from opportunism. For example, if 
MNEs, which suffer from cumulative debt problems, invest abroad to meet strong requests 
from their close business clients, JVs serve as an optimal way of minimizing operational costs 
while tapping quickly into local markets. In sum, the decision to opt for JV may be motivated 
by the internalization of financial resources among partners. 
From a behavioural perspective, experience again plays a crucial role in determining 
the entry mode choice of MNEs. Chang and Rosenzweig (2001) confirmed that firms tend to 
undertake entry modes used already in previous foreign market entries.  
According to institutional theory, political stability, FDI ownership restrictions, 
cultural affinity, social capital and legal rules can be influential variables explaining the level 
of ownership when investing abroad. Past research (Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Yiu and 
Makino 2002) confirms the importance of socio-cultural distance for the relative value of 
local partners. The argument is that operations in a dissimilar culture raise information costs. 
  13While we believe this to be true, we would add that socio-cultural distance equally 
complicates negotiation and cooperation with JV partners. It remains therefore theoretically 
unclear, whether JV formation is more or less appropriate in a culturally distant investment 
location.  
Shared entry modes are one of the means to mitigate unfavourable locational factors, 
especially, if institutional barriers are high. Bhaumik and Gelb (2005) suggest that the form of 
JV or acquisition will be more profitable in countries with insufficient institutional systems 
and lacking government support. He (2003: 402) stresses that JVs facilitate access to 
marketing channels and knowledge creation with regard to local policies, business practices 
and operating conditions embedded in unknown business environments. The creation of 
strategic alliances with local partners may enhance the adaptability to local markets and 
attenuate political hazards and institutional uncertainty by taking advantage of local partners’ 
social networks. JVs play a role in obtaining legitimacy and recognition from local 
communities (Yiu and Makino 2002; Meyer and Nguyen 2005). A countervailing influence 
originates from deficiencies in IPR protection, which are often going hand-in-hand with other 
institutional shortcomings. A lack of IPR protection aggravates threads of shirking by local 
partners, thus tremendously increasing transaction costs of JV operation. Accordingly, Lee 
and Mansfield (1996) associate JV formation with effective IPR protection. It is hard to 
decide theoretically, which mechanism is more decisive.  
On a different note, full ownership modes may be less susceptible to institutional 
uncertainties and volatile economic structures in indigenous markets when economic 
activities of subsidiaries are embedded into the parent’s global strategy. Therefore, industries 
predominantly characterized by global value chains may show comparatively higher ratios of 
full ownership modes. 
Empirical evidence on the influence of locational and institutional characteristics 
remains inconclusive. While Brouthers (2002) found that economic and political risks affect 
the entry mode choice in a survey research based on 105 European firms, Tsang (2005) failed 
to support the conjecture that the ownership patterns of foreign manufacturing firms in 
Vietnam are affected by the level of country risks. Delios and Beamish (1999) confirmed that 
host country restrictiveness exerts a negative impact on the degree of equity control. Yiu and 
Makino (2002) and Sanchez-Peinado and Pla-Barber (2006) find that a higher level of country 
risk is associated with a hierarchical form of governance, while numerous scholars (Gatignon 
and Anderson 1988; Palenzuela and Bobillo 1999) report an inverse relationship between 
country risk and ownership. 
  14To sum up, firms face trade-offs between the level of control, the cost of resource 
commitment and the degree of location- and institution-specific hazards when choosing 
between JV and WOS ventures in the expansion of offshore activities. The previous studies 
(Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Yiu and Makino 2002) insist that full control modes allow the 
firm to enjoy higher returns and proprietary knowledge protection at the expense of suffering 
from gaining social and market legitimacy in local environments. On the other hand, the cost 
of economic, political and institutional hazards in developing countries can be minimized by 
an integrated form of equity control although coordination problems place constraints on the 
efficiency of operations. Finally, it should also be noted that a firm may not have any 
alternatives to WOS, if there are no adequate and capable partners who may contribute to the 
returns on investment in local markets (Zejan 1990). Figure 7 exhibits a conceptual 
foundation for understanding the entry mode selection mechanism incorporating three 
different aspects: firm, industry, and locational factors.  
 











To decide on the ownership structure when a firm enters a new market environment – with a 
hierarchical form of control (full ownership) on the one hand and a hybrid form of control 
(partial ownership) on the other – is a rather qualitative choice (Kogut and Singh 1988). 
According to Toyo Keizai (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006), there are 
more than 330 Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries in Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. After excluding Japanese MNEs, whose entry mode is not clarified yet, which 
took the form of M&A, or whose financial data is not publicly obtainable, 318 observations 
are available for our study. We use a binomial logit model for the new venture ownership 
choice variable, where a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary is defined as one, while a foreign-
local JV is zero. The binomial logit regression model is given as  
Firm-specific factors 
Entry mode selection Industry-specific factors 
Locational factors 
  15Pij = exp (βjXij)/Σexp (βjXij), 
where Pij is the probability that firm i will select entry mode j, Xij corresponds to a marginal 
effect of independent variables which exert an effect on the ownership strategies of firm i. βj 
refers to the coefficients of the explanatory variables. We test the entry mode choice for 
factors, which represent complex multidimensional concepts in accordance with the 
complexity of determinants in the transaction cost and resource-based theories. We now turn 
to discussing the rationale for inclusion of individual explanatory variables and specifying 
them in detail. 
Operationalization of Explanatory Variables 
In line with our theoretical framework the explanatory variables constitute groups of firm-
specific variables, location-specific factors, and industry dummy variables.  
Firm-Specific Factors 
The MNE characteristics of interest here are those, which determine the application of 
technology to the FDI project.  
Firm size: Previous studies have associated the size of the firm with its accumulation of 
competitive knowledge and technologies (Andersson and Svensson 1994; Chang and 
Rosenzweig 2001). From a resource-based perspective, size can be taken as a proxy for the 
managerial resources, such as capable expatriates and tested routines, available to apply 
technological knowledge to new projects. Less need for complementary external resources 
should thus lead to a greater propensity to opt for full ownership. On the other hand, Meyer 
(1998) argues that the formation of a JV requires MNEs to restructure the organization of a 
local partner’s venture and to integrate it into their global production value chains. Thus, a 
MNE undertaking a JV should possess strong core competencies. He postulates that small 
firms on average possess more limited core competencies so that the size of firms should be 
positively related to the ability to undertake JVs. A small firm may prefer full ownership to 
partial ownership since the cost of coordination with local partners may be higher due to its 
on average comparatively poor international experience. The results of Claver and Quer 
(2005) and Delios and Beamish (1999) support this proposition, while other previous 
scholarship (Brouthers 2002; Chang and Rosenzweig 2001; Palenzuela and Bobillo 1999) 
shows that firm size does not exert a significant influence on the international entry mode 
choice. Consistent with Horaguchi (1992) we use the number of employees of parent 
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Shinpōsha’s Kaisha Zaimu Karute (2007). 
Firm age: The argument on firm age (AGE) is similar to that on firm size, since firms tend to 
accumulate their knowledge and experience over time. Data are obtained from Toyo Keizai 
Shinpōsha’s Kaisha Zaimu Karute (2007). 
R&D intensity: Technological capabilities are one important intangible asset to be applied to 
foreign investment projects but at the same time to be protected from unintended spillovers. 
The higher control associated with full ownership allows more effective knowledge protection 
than what may be feasible in a JV. R&D expenditure is a widely used variable for measuring 
technological capabilities of developed country firms. We use a ratio of R&D expenditure 
relative to total sales (RD) in order to distinguish this type of resources from the size effect. 
The predicted impact of RD on full ownership according to the above argument is a positive 
one. Data are obtained from Toyo Keizai Shinpōsha’s Kaisha Zaimu Karute (2007). 
Human capital intensity: The impact of human capital (HUMAN) on the entry mode of 
Japanese firms should be the same as that of R&D. Following Belderbos and Sleuwaegen 
(1996: 216), we use a ratio of human capital expense relative to total sales. Data are obtained 
from Toyo Keizai Shinpōsha’s Kaisha Zaimu Karute (2007). 
Regional network:  The literature on the influence of international experience is still 
inconclusive. Anderson and Gatignon (1986) point to the role of experience for the capability 
to efficiently manage foreign subsidiaries. From this line of argument the inclination of the 
MNE to form JVs should fall with experience. The opposite argument assumes that 
managerial expertise is scarce and not easily replicated. Under such conditions, a large 
network would require the MNE to spread its managerial resources thinly over the network 
(Davidson and McFetridge 1984). A third argument concerns the social capital being locally 
built by earlier subsidiaries (NETWORK). When they operate in a market they start to build 
connections to local actors and probably make those connections available to the newcomer as 
well. This would diminish the advantage of local partners. From the above, it is impossible to 
define clear expectations on the impact of the variable. For estimation, we used the number of 
subsidiaries in Southeast Asia obtained from Toyo Keizai Shinpōsha’s Kaishabetsu Kaigai 
Shinshutsu Kigyo Sōran (2005). 
Financial debt: The common argument is that a firm, which has a higher debt-to-equity ratio, 
is likely to partner with others in order to diversify and minimize the risk of failure due to 
increased operational risks in incomplete developing markets. The predicted sign would be 
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local one, so that this prediction has to be question-marked. In our study, we use a debt-to-
equity ratio (DEBT) as an adequate proxy for financial performance. Data are obtained from 
Toyo Keizai Shinpōsha’s Kaisha Zaimu Karute (2007). 
Financial performance: In parallel to financial debt, financial performance is considered as a 
strong determinant of ownership structure (Claver and Quer 2005). But the same caveat with 
regard to equity participation of local partners mentioned above applies here as well: other 
Japanese or foreign partners could provide complementary financial assets just as effectively. 
The definition of performance can be twofold. One is profitability whereas another is 
productivity. Productivity is partly captured by our technology-related variables, so we apply 
return on assets (ROA) as a profitability measure here. Data are obtained from Toyo Keizai 
Shinpōsha’s Kaisha Zaimu Karute (2007). 
Industry-Specific Factors 
We include industry dummy variables so as to evaluate the magnitude of variations in 
industrial organization patterns across industries. Three industries are tested as follows: food 
(FOOD), consumer electronics and electronics components (ELECTRO) and car assembly 
and transport equipments (AUTO).  
Food industry: The food industry is often strongly embedded in the local environment, since 
it tends to rely on local inputs and often targets local consumer. Gomez-Casseres (1989) 
asserts this relationship for all resource-based industries. The food industry is usually also 
subject to strong health and safety regulations. Therefore, the local regulatory environment is 
relatively important in this industry. We can expect more joint ventures than in other 
industries. 
Electronic industry: The electronic industry can be taken as an opposite case to the food 
industry. Electronics are usually produced in global value chains, which tend to locate low-
value added intermediate processes in ASEAN countries. Vulnerability by local institutional 
shortcomings should therefore be much lower here, leading to a higher propensity to choose a 
full ownership mode.  
Car assembly and transport equipment: In this industry global value chains also prevail. The 
main difference to the electronic industry lies in the political interest the automotive industry 
is often attracting. At least four ASEAN countries have or used to have national car projects 
with all the associated protection. It has hence been crucial for global suppliers to build strong 
connections to local regulators in order to get access. Sometimes wholly foreign-owned 
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be tilted towards the JV mode. 
Locational Factors 
Locational characteristics can be interpreted as host country assets or liabilities, which 
influence the level of transaction costs. Such costs may come as both the predetermined cost 
of doing business and the costs from the risks associated with an investment location (Tornell 
and Velasco 1992). The former can be captured by measuring the regulatory quality in general 
and the business freedom in particular.  
Regulatory quality: Improved regulatory quality has been associated with better functioning 
markets and increased FDI flows (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2005). Under such conditions 
the assistance and mediation by local equity partners is less crucial for efficient transactions 
with the bureaucracy as well as suppliers and customers. As a measure of regulatory quality 
(REGUL) we apply the Worldbank governance indicator (Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 2006) on 
regulatory quality because it presents the most comprehensive evaluation available. The index 
is a secondary index calculated from expert assessments and surveys from up to 12 different 
sources per country. Among the sources are much used indicators such as the Heritage 
Foundation Economic Freedom Index, the Political Risk Services International Country Risk 
Guide and the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report. Since perception by 
managers is formed over time and the development of an investment project is also time-
consuming, we use the average score for the three years prior to investment. Better regulatory 
quality is expected to be associated with a higher inclination to form wholly foreign-owned 
subsidiaries. Therefore, the predicted sign is positive. 
Business freedom (BUSFREE) is a measure to assess the average costs of regulatory 
requirements in connection with the basic operation of the individual business. These include, 
among others, regulations on the establishment of new enterprises, the access to loans, the 
contracting of workers and the eventual shut-down of operations. Since it is not possible to 
extract ratings on individual aspects of regulatory quality from the Worldbank index, we use 
data from one of its contributing sources. The Business Freedom Index published by the 
Heritage Foundation (Heritage Foundation 2007) is most appropriate here, since it attempts to 
define variables as objectively as possible. For instance, the regulatory burden is measured in 
terms of number of required licenses, average time and cost as a share of per capita income 
necessary to process the licenses. Even narrower than the business freedom measure is its 
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conditions for foreign MNEs. For both the expected sign is again positive. 
Country risk, on the other hand, is composed of complex factors (Anderson and Gatignon 
1986), many of which can be subsumed under the headings of rule of law, volatility of the 
economy and socio-cultural distance. According to Tsang’s argument (2005: 445), “foreign 
investors would avoid WOS [wholly-owned subsidiaries; the authors], which represents the 
highest degree of internalization when they enter a risky host country”. 
Rule of law:  An important source of institutional risk for an investor consists of the 
difficulties encountered when invoking the judicial system to enforce his property rights. 
Equally, discrepancies between formal laws and regulations and actual bureaucratic 
procedures pose a risk to those who have to rely on them for their business operations 
(DeHart-Davis and Bozeman 2001). Corruption is one possible expression of such 
discrepancies. Some authors have argued that inconsistent rule of law is more risky in a JV 
structure, where property rights tend to be more contested by the equity partners (Asiedu and 
Esfahani 2001), while others contend that JVs with local participation may leverage the 
latter’s social capital to mitigate external threats to property rights (Bhaumik and Gelb 2005; 
Tsang 2005). It is not easy to decide theoretically, which mechanism is more relevant. We use 
the World Bank governance indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 2006) on the rule of law 
(INSTQLY) as our measure of the rule of law because it may be taken as an expression of the 
state of international knowledge on the issue. It combines up to 19 different sources of mostly 
perceptive assessments of the extent of the rule of law in different countries. Again, we use 
the average score for the three years prior to investment. 
Economic risk: An important objective and outcome of institutional infrastructure is to 
achieve general economic stability in a country, which is assumed to be a precondition for 
sustainable development. We proxy economic stability and its adversary – economic risk 
(ECONRISK) – by the inflation rate. The inflation rate is a well-understood, straight-forward 
and in general well-publicised measure, which managers are likely to take into account to 
define their risk perception of an investment location. We use the three year average prior to 
investment of inflation rates as published by the IMF (2006) and expect a negative sign, 
meaning that a higher inflation rate contributes to JV mode choices. 
Socio-cultural distance: The socio-cultural distance (CULTDIST) is a measure, which 
proxies the expected difficulty to communicate and build relationships between foreign 
investors and local actors. The theoretical discussion provides no clear direction as to whether 
  20large socio-cultural distance rather necessitates or complicates local equity participation. 
Meaningful quantification of the concept of culture has also proven to be extremely difficult. 
In the absence of agreed measures of socio-cultural distance, we have to rely on the contested 
Hofstede dimensions (Hofstede 2003). Our proxy is formed by adding the differences in value 
of the four dimensions – the higher/lower the indicator value the greater/narrower the socio-
cultural distance. 
 
Table 3: Summary of Explanatory Variables and the Expected Signs for the Wholly 
Foreign-owned Entry Mode 
 
  Explanatory 
Variables  Description  Expected sign 
for WOS N Mean  SD  Min  Max
Firm-specific factors
SIZE  Firm size as the log of 
the number of employees
+/- 318 3,5 0,6  2,1  4,8
AGE  Firm age in years at the time of 
establishment of the subsidiary 
+/- 318 64,9 19,1 1,0  185,0
RD  R&D-intensity of the MNE 
(R&D-to-sales ratio)
+ 318 3,6 2,7  0 13,4
HUMAN  Human capital 
(Labour expenses-to-sales ratio)
+ 318 4,9 3,3  0,3  21,2
NETWORK Number of foreign subsidiaries +/- 318 13,6 21,7 0 118,0
DEBT  Financial vulnerability 
(Debt-to-equity ratio)
- 318 156,9 135,2  15,5 936,4
ROA  Financial performance 
(Return on assets)
- 318 4,1 3,8  -11,5  19,6
Industry-specific factors 
FOOD  Dummy variable for 
food industry
- 318 0 0,2  01
ELECTRO  Dummy variable for 
electronic industry
+ 318 0,1 0,4  01
AUTO  Dummy variable for 
automobile industry
- 318 0,2 0,4  01
Locational factors 
REGUL  Regulatory quality + 318 0,3 0,6  -1,2 2,0
BUSFREE  Business freedom + 318 43,3 20,0 10,0 90,0
FDIFREE  Investment freedom + 317 20,7 1,1  19,3 23,2
INSTQLY  Institutional quality 
(rule of law) 
+/- 318 0 0,8  -1,3 2,1
ECONRISK  Economic risk 
(inflation rate)
- 318 6,0 7,1  0,3  34,3
CULTURE  Socio-cultural distance +/- 318 142,2 20,2 95,0 287,0
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123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6
1 SIZE 1
2 AGE 0.1842* 1
3 RD 0.4104* 0.1005 1
4 HUMAN -0.3012* 0.0288 0.0445 1
5 NETWORK 0.4482* 0.0486 0.0783 -0.1779* 1
6 DEBT 0.1151* 0.088 -0.3075* -0.3047* 0.3730* 1
7 ROA 0.0264 -0.1996* 0.2343* 0.049 -0.0974 -0.3797* 1
8 FOOD 0.1094 0.0044 -0.0521 0.1524* -0.0359 -0.1001 0.0683 1
9 ELECTRO -0.0243 -0.1146* 0.1551* 0.106 0.1494* -0.0295 -0.0196 -0.0644 1
10 AUTO 0.1420* -0.0699 0.1154* -0.2857* -0.0663 -0.0712 0.1655* -0.0759 -0.1893* 1
11 REGUL -0.0227 -0.0987 -0.0653 -0.0204 -0.0473 -0.0067 -0.0661 0.0375 -0.054 -0.0944 1
12 BUSFREE 0.0172 -0.0998 -0.063 -0.0149 -0.045 -0.0134 -0.0556 0.0744 -0.0896 -0.0796 0.9213* 1
13 FDIFREE 0.0335 -0.0613 -0.0082 0.0954 0.01 -0.024 0.0561 0.0935 -0.0158 -0.1318* 0.6530* 0.6868* 1
14 INSTQLY 0.0054 -0.11 -0.0526 0.0363 -0.052 -0.0135 -0.0329 0.0601 -0.0406 -0.1246* 0.9013* 0.9215* 0.7748* 1
15 ECONRISK 0.0475 0.1399* -0.0022 -0.1380* 0.0923 0.1409* -0.0826 -0.0598 -0.0727 0.1133* -0.3257* -0.3833* -0.5255* -0.5487* 1
16 CULTURE 0.0735 0.1021 0.0715 0.0691 0.0454 -0.0402 0.0568 0.038 -0.0278 -0.0043 0.0831 0.0869 0.5354* 0.1159* 0.0104 1
N=318.
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% level. SD indicates standard deviation.
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Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Constant 3.78***
In this section, we present the estimation results using a binomial logit regression model on a 
sample of 318 Japanese manufacturing firms for the period from 1998 to 2004. Descriptive 
statistics provided in Table 3 include mean values and standard deviations of variables used. 
Table 4 demonstrates the Pearson correlation matrix of independent variables. It indicates that 
there is little multicollinearity except for the locational variables which are correlated with 
Table 5: The Logit Model: Determinants of Entry Mode for  






























































      
INVESTFREE    0.43***
(3.02)
  







CULTURE       0.01*
(1.65)
Log likelihood –160.50 –157.33 –154.62 –157.33 –157.78 –157.07 –159.04
R-squared 0,144 0,161 0,169 0,161 0,159 0,162 0,154
Prob>Chi2 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Observation 318 318 317 318 318 318 318
Correctly classfied 76,73% 77,04% 76,34% 76,42% 76,73% 76,10% 76,42%
Note:  z-values are reported in parentheses. z and P>z correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0, *** 








































































































Dependent variable: Greenfield=1; JV=0
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each other (ex. r (REGUL, BUSFREE) = 0.913). To solve the issue of multicollinearity, 
separate regression analyses for each of the locational variables are carried out. We confirmed 
coefficient values and statistical significance by employing STATA/SE9.0. Table 5 displays 
the results of the binomial logit model. The two columns in each cell show the coefficients 
and z-values for the probability that a firm undertakes a full foreign ownership arrangement 
when investing in Southeast Asian countries. Each model has the ability to correctly predict 
the odds of full ownership at more than 75 percent.  
The econometric analysis explores the impact of a set of factors predicted by existing 
theories such as ownership advantages theory, transaction cost theory, resource-based theory 
and location factors theory. The regression results point to some noteworthy aspects of the 
entry mode selection of Japanese MNEs entering Southeast Asia. We tested six location-
specific variables at the country level while seven variables using unique firm-level data and 
three industry dummies are also incorporated at the same time.  
The coefficients of SIZE are statistically significant and negative at the 5 percent 
significance levels. Our empirical results confirm that SIZE positively contributes to the 
choice of shared ownership. These results are consistent with the study of Meyer (1998), 
supporting the notion that a larger size is associated with competencies necessary for 
managing the risks and difficulties of cooperative ventures. The firm age variable (AGE) only 
shows a low statistical significance (in models 1 and 7) and small negative coefficients. This 
result is in line with the intuitive logic that firm survival is a much lesser predictor of firm 
capabilities than firm growth. 
We find that other firm-specific variables, RD, NETWORK and ROA  are not 
statistically significant in all the models presented, although they show the predicted signs. 
The absence of statistical significance for the RD variable implies that the overall 
technological intensity of the MNE plays no vital role in the choice of entry mode. This may 
be due to an extensively reported propensity of Japanese firms to establish manufacturing 
subsidiaries in Southeast Asia that specialize in non-critical low-technology or labor-intensive 
production activities. There, hence, exists no need to protect high-level proprietary 
technologies with a high-control mode of ownership when investing in Southeast Asia. With 
regard to NETWORK, the empirical relationship turns out to be just as ambiguous as the 
theoretical one. And financial performance, measured as ROA, does not tell us anything 
about the propensity to take in local JV partners. 
In contrast, the other firm-specific variables, DEBT and HUMAN possess at least 
some explanatory power for the pattern of ownership arrangements by Japanese 
manufacturing firms in Southeast Asia. Consistent with our hypothesis, HUMAN is positive   25
and weakly statistically significant, while DEBT  exerts a small negative influence on the 
probability that a firm chooses a full ownership entry. However, the HUMAN variable loses 
statistical significance and a little explanatory power in most of the models where locational 
variables are included. This suggests that there might be some self-selection of companies 
with higher human capital intensity into locations with better investment conditions.  
The estimation results for the industry-specific variables are interesting. Our empirical 
findings support the hypothesis that industry-heterogeneity matters. While the AUTO dummy 
variable does not appear to play a significant role, the two industry dummy variables FOOD 
and ELECTRO are influential in explaining the choice of entry mode of FDI in Southeast 
Asia. Japanese firms investing in the food industry tend to form a joint venture while WOS is 
the most common mode for Japanese firms investing in the electronics industry. There are 
some clear implications. Japanese manufacturing firms operating in the food industry tend to 
target local markets and to acquire local raw materials, they are subjected to a host of health 
and price regulations, and they may also seek higher returns on investment in the short run so 
that they are more dependent on local partners who are familiar with market regulatory 
frameworks and have extensive marketing networks. In contrast, the electronic industry is 
organized along global value chains formed on the basis of comparative costs and capabilities. 
Due to limited local market size it is of little interest to Japanese manufacturing firms in the 
electronics industry to target local markets. Rather, their strategic aim is to export their locally 
produced products to the US and European markets. Their interactions with the investment 
locality can thus be much more limited with lesser need for local market and regulatory 
knowledge, and they indeed are. FDIs in the industry are sometimes even exempted from a 
number of foreign equity and other regulatory restrictions due to the competition among host 
countries for highly valued high-tech investments, under which electronics are often 
subsumed.  
In our model estimations, locational characteristics are found to influence the entry 
mode selection of Japanese manufacturing firms. First, the coefficients for REGUL, 
BUSINESSFREE and INVESTFREE have the expected positive sign and are statistically 
significant at the 1 to 5 percent levels. These results suggest that the presence of favourable 
institutional environments accompanied by proactive FDI policy indeed affect the ownership 
structure of Japanese manufacturing firms. Overall, countries with developed institutional 
infrastructure systems facilitate Japanese firms’ undertaking wholly foreign-owned ventures. 
High values diminish the need for forming a venture with local partners. The same holds for 
the rule of law (INSTQLY). It is however worth taking note of the fact that the regulatory   26
burden captured by BUSINESSFREE has a much lower impact than the risk associated with 
deficient rule of law.  
Economic risk as measured by the inflation rate (ECONRISK) is statistically 
significant and has a negative relationship with the ownership structure as we predicted. It is 
Japanese manufacturing firms that prefer to undertake a shared entry mode when the state of 
local economies is financially fragile. Such market instability signals Japanese entrants to opt 
for a JV since financial commitments are shared by two partners. Our result thus contradicts 
the study of Sanchez-Peinado and Pla-Barber (2006).  
Lastly, our empirical results lend only weak support for the hypothesis that socio-
cultural distance (CULTURE) is positively associated with the entry mode selection. The 
coefficient is also very small. This can be interpreted as confirmation of the double-edged 
impact of socio-cultural distance discussed in the theoretical part.  
In the following section, we summarize the empirical evidence and provide some 
proposals for future research. 
Concluding Remarks and Future Research 
It is of great interest to examine the entry mode selection of the Japanese manufacturing firms 
in Southeast Asia after 1997, since the aftermath of the Asian monetary crisis, the emergence 
of China and technological catch-up by other Asian firms put Japanese manufacturing firms 
under pressure to reconfigure their regional production networks. The appropriate choice of 
modal entry paves the way for Japanese firms to achieve a high level of profitability, 
efficiency, and stability of operations in an era of growing, uncontrollably mobile capital. The 
determinants of this choice are also of great interest to host governments, which consider 
investment policies as part of a broader development strategy. From a host government 
perspective, a transfer of cutting-edge technology, organizational skills and managerial 
knowledge from foreign firms to domestic firms is inevitable for the nation to further 
revitalize its economy in the post-crisis period. Our focus has been on the motives underlying 
the ownership choice of Japanese firms in Southeast Asia. In this paper, a binomial logit 
model was tested on a sample of 318 Japanese manufacturing firms in the period from 1998 to 
2004 in Southeast Asia.  
  Some of our results are consistent with those of the previous scholarship that explored 
underlying factors influencing the entry mode strategies. First, regarding the effect of the 
firm-specific variables on entry mode selection, we have confirmed a negative relationship 
between firm size and the level of organizational commitments in accordance with prior 
studies (Meyer, 1998). This lends support to the resource-based view that core competencies 
have significant implications in predicting a firm’s entry mode. We found that the higher the   27
human capital intensity is the higher is the probability of a full ownership mode, while higher 
debt exposure tends to be associated with a slightly lower level of resource commitment. 
However, the human capital intensity usually loses its statistical significance when tested 
together with locational variables. This suggests that locational variables in combination with 
self-selection of firms into different host-countries are partly responsible for the human 
capital effect. Effects of other firm-specific variables, such as the research intensity, network 
and performance on ownership governance, are not confirmed by our data. 
Second, our empirical findings lend support to the conjecture that industry 
characteristics also play a role. Two industry dummy variables, food and electronics, are 
influential in explaining the structure of equity ownership when investing in Southeast Asia. 
Japanese firms in the food industry tend to form a JV while WOS is the most favoured entry 
mode for Japanese firms investing in the electronics industry. These results imply that 
between-industry variations of regulatory burdens in combination with industry-specific 
industrial organization patterns account for much of the variation in entry-mode choice. While 
firms in the food industry have a need to address comparatively strict regulatory environments 
through an integrated form of governance with indigenous firms, electronic MNEs tend to 
take advantage of the region independently, using it as an export platform without much 
regulatory interference.  
Third, our results indicate that institutional characteristics of investment locations, 
such as investment freedom, business freedom, rule of law and regulatory quality exert a 
positive impact on the choice of full ownership. Among the different factors, business 
freedom shows the least impact. Such a result indicates that local partners are predominantly 
used to mitigate institutional risks and circumvent restriction on foreign investment rather 
than to tackle the overall regulatory burden. For host country governments the message could 
be that an improvement of the regulatory environment does not necessarily lead to a stark 
decrease in the number of the usually higher valued JVs.  
Although our empirical results allow deep insights into the influential determinants of 
the initial choice of entry modes by Japanese manufacturing firms, they are still far from 
conclusive. We address some shortcomings and suggestions. First, we do not elaborate on the 
relationship of firms’ negotiating power, market share, and reputation with the ownership 
arrangements, which are important in the bargaining framework. Second, it should be 
clarified more explicitly how the entry mode choice of Japanese MNEs in Southeast Asia 
varies by different investment motives such as resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-
seeking and strategic FDI. A hint on the importance of this point is given by the results for the 
industry dummies. Third, it would be interesting whether entry mode determinants are home-  28
country specific. Fourth, our research could be extended to examine whether the traditional 
transaction cost approach also takes account of dynamic changes in a MNE’s ownership 
structure over time and to what extent the development of ‘trust’ and ‘reciprocal commitment’ 
shape Japanese firms’ ownership strategies in Southeast Asia over time. Finally, a more 
refined approach is called for regarding the measurement of culture so as to allow more 
precise estimates of the influence of socio-cultural differences, even though our result already 
show a weak significance. All these puzzles take further the context-specific approach 
emphasized in this research.  
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